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I. INTRODUCTION
In a remarkable conversion, the so-called liberal wing of the U.S. Supreme
Court, led by Justice Stevens, decided in Kelo v. City of New London' that
federalism (state action is preferable to federal action across a spectrum of
subjects) is a good thing after all. This is the same block which fulminated
against the rebirth of federalism, the resuscitation of the Tenth Amendment,
and similar relatively recent holdings by the so-called conservative wing of the
Court in such cases as United States v. Lopez,2 New York v. United States,3
and Gregory v. Ashcroft.4 Arguably going back to a somewhat different
Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,5
Justice Stevens, usually joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsberg and Souter, has
pressed for an increasingly pervasive federal role in the affairs of citizens at
the expense of state and local government. His opinion in Kelo, in which he
is joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, and Souter (Justice Kennedy separately
concurring) represents a philosophical U-turn in favor of state action and
against the establishment of federal criteria, and from an area of law that cries
out for federal standards and oversight. As demonstrated below, the states
have certainly taken him at his word.
In Kelo v. City of New London, a bare majority of the Court upheld the
exercise of eminent domain for the purpose of economic revitalization.
Heavily relying on its previous decisions in Berman v. Parker6 and Hawaii
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___U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
2 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
4 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
5 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
6 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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Housing Authority v. Midkiff,7 the Court stated that it was too late in the game
to revisit its present expansive view of public use, formally stating that there
is no difference in modem eminent domain practice between public use and
public purpose'-at least in federal court. Indeed, the Court specifically
equated public use and public purpose before holding that condemning land
for economic revitalization was at worst simply another small step along the
continuum of permitting public benefits to be sufficient indicia of meeting
public use/public purpose requirements for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause.9 The Court specifically held that it is now up
to the states to decide whether or not to increase the burden on government
exercise of compulsory purchase powers.'0 The federal bar is presently set so
low as to be little more than a speed bump. It is worth setting out what the
Court decided in Kelo, and on what basis, before describing more fully the
shift in favor of federalism there embraced by Justice Stevens' majority
opinion.
II. THE STATE OF THE FEDERAL LAW ON PUBLIC USE BEFORE KELO:
BERMAN V. PARKER AND HAWAii HOUSING AUTHORITY V. MIDKIFF
The members of the Court expressed different views on the historical
antecedents of public use and how far back to go in deriving an appropriate
definition to apply in Kelo.11 Nevertheless, all (except perhaps Justice
Thomas) agree that the most relevant precedents are the decisions of the Court
in Berman and Midkiff. In both decisions, the Court wrote expansively about
the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
' 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
8 __ U.S. -, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005).
9 Id. at 2665-66.
10 Of the slightly more than a dozen state courts that have considered whether economic
revitalization is sufficient public use for governmental exercise of eminent domain, about
half-such as Connecticut and now the U.S. Supreme Court-have decided that it is, and about
half-such as Michigan in its recent and thoroughly reviewed and discussed County of Wayne
v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004)-that it is not, utilizing various tests such as
whether the condemnation serves primarily a public purpose or primarily benefits the private
sector. See Steven J. Eagle, The Public Use Requirement and Doctrinal Renewal, 34 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10999 (2004) for extensive analysis and commentary, and Amanda S. Eckhoff& Dwight
H. Merriam, Public Use Goes Peripatetic: First, Michigan Reverses Poletown And Now The
Supreme Court Grants Review In An Eminent Domain Case, 57 PLAN. AND ENVTL. L. 3 (2005).
" Ranging from the lengthy historical analysis provided by Justice Thomas in dissent (he
would have the Court return to original meaning in the 18th century in which most eminent
domain cases appear to require actual use by the public, though Justice Stevens reads some of
the same history quite differently by choosing other cases from that period upon which to rely)
to concentration only on mid to late twentieth century cases by Justice Stevens for the majority
and Justice O'Connor in dissent.
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In Berman, the Court dealt with the condemnation of a thriving department
store contained in a large parcel condemned by a redevelopment agency for
the statutory (Congressional in this case) purpose of eliminating blight, all in
accordance with a required redevelopment plan.'2 Justice Douglas for the
majority commenced by observing famously that a community could decide
to be attractive as well as safe, and that in thus justifying eminent domain to
accomplish these goals, "[w]e deal, in other words, with . . . the police
power[,] ' 3 a controversial joining of the two powers which has affected
definitions of public use ever since by obviating any need for the public to
actually use the property condemned so long as it furthered a public purpose.
Indeed, the landowners pointed out that their land would simply be turned
over to another private owner. 14 No matter, said Douglas:
But the means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to
determine, once the public purpose has been established. ... The public end may
be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through
a department of government-or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say
that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of
community redevelopment projects. 5
To the landowners' argument that their particular parcel was unblighted and
that therefore its condemnation violated the Fifth Amendment's public
purpose clause, Justice Douglas responded that if experts concluded the area
must be planned as a whole in order to prevent reversion to a slum, so be it.'6
Despite this broad language, many conceived the decision to apply largely to
redevelopment projects, and in particularly those which were well-planned in
accordance with clear statutory mandates. Not so after Midkiff.
In 1967, the Hawai'i State Legislature passed a land reform act the principle
purpose of which was to eliminate a perceived oligopoly in available
residential land which was thought to adversely affect the price and
availability of housing for its citizens.' 7 Eminent domain was the means
chosen to solve the problem. The act authorized a state agency-the Hawai'i
Housing Authority-to condemn the fee simple interest in land which was
leased to individual homeowners, for the purpose of conveying that interest
to some other private owner, usually the existing owner's lessee who owned
the house on the land.'" The main target of the legislation was the Bishop
12 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954).
13 Id. at 32.
14 Id. at 31.
"5 Id. at 33-34.
16 Id. at 34-35.
17 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1984).
18 Id. at 233.
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Estate (as it was then known), a charitable trust created by Princess Bernice
Pauahi Bishop, a descendent of King Kamehameha the Great and whose large
landholdings she eventually inherited. The Estate challenged the act's
condemnation process as a taking without the public use required by the U.S.
Constitution's Fifth Amendment.' 9 While the Federal District Court upheld
the statute, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statute essentially
provided for a "naked" transfer from one private individual to another, and so
lacked the requisite public use.2"
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit, citing Berman for the proposition that once a legislative body had
declared a public purpose, it was not for federal courts to interfere unless that
purpose was "inconceivable" or an "impossibility."'" The means were
irrelevant; this was simply a mechanism or process to accomplish the
legislatively-declared public purpose. Indeed, it would make no difference,
said Justice O'Connor writing for the Court, if that public purpose never came
to pass, so long as the legislature could reasonably have thought it would
when enacting the statute.22 Note throughout the frequent use of public
purpose, instead of public use. These words would come back to haunt Justice
O'Connor in Kelo, as appears below.
III. KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON
The Court in Kelo simply extended the reasoning in Berman and Midkiff to
the economic revitalization condemnations increasingly common throughout
urban areas in the United States during the last quarter of the Twentieth
Century. Indeed, the majority was singularly unimpressed with extreme uses
of eminent domain for the purposes of providing employment and bettering
the local tax base as the parties brought to its attention: "A parade of horribles
is especially unpersuasive in this context since the Takings Clause largely
'operates as a conditional limitation permitting the government to do what it
wants so long as it pays the charge."' 23
The facts in Kelo are straightforward. In order to take advantage of a
substantial private investment in new facilities by Pfizer, Inc., in an
19 Id. at 234-35.
20 id. at 235.
2 Id. at 240.
22 Id. at 241.
23 Kelo v. City of New London, _ U.S. _, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2667 n.19 (2005) (citing
Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998)). See DANA BERUNER, INST. FOR JUSTICE,
PUBLIc POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIvE YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2003), http://www.casdecoalition.org/pdf/report/EDReport.pdf, for a
compendious list of such "horribles."
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economically depressed area of New London along the Thames River, the City
reactivated the private non-profit New London Development Corporation
("NLDC") to assist in planning the area's economic development.24
Authorized and aided by grants totaling millions of dollars, NLDC held
meetings and eventually "finalized an integrated development plan focused on
[ninety] acres in the Fort Trumbull area., 25 The City Council also authorized
the NLDC to purchase property or to acquire property by exercising eminent
domain in the City's name.26 Although the NLDC successfully negotiated the
purchase of most of the real estate, its negotiations with Kelo and fellow
petitioners failed. 2' As a consequence, the NLDC initiated the condemnation
proceedings that gave rise to this case.2' There was no allegation than any of
these properties were blighted or in poor condition; rather they were
condemned "only because they happen to be located in the development
area. 29
The Kelos owned a single-family house with a water view, in which Mrs.
Kelo had lived since 1997.3° Petitioner Wilhemina Dery was born in her home
in 1918, and has lived there her entire life.3" On these facts, petitioners
claimed that the taking of their property violated the public use restriction in
the Fifth Amendment.32 A trial court agreed as to the parcel containing the
Kelo house, but a divided Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding
that all of the City's proposed takings were constitutional.33 Noting that the
proposed takings were authorized by the state's municipal development statute
and in particular the taking of even developed land as part of an economic
development project was for a public use and in the public interest, the court
relied on Berman and Midkiff in holding that such economic development
qualified as a public use under both Federal and State Constitutions.' The
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari "to determine whether a city's decision
to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfies the 'public
use' requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 35
The Court's answer: an unequivocal yes. While the Court noted that
24 Kelo, - U.S. -, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
25 id.
26 Id. at , 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
27 Id.
2 Id.
29 Id.
3 id.
31 id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at_, 125 S. Ct. at 2660-61.
3 Id. at, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
15 Id. at , 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
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the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring
to it another private party B .... [I]t is equally clear that a State may transfer
property from one private party to another if future 'use by the public' is the
purpose of the taking... 36
The question, then, is what constitutes sufficient use by the public. Three
factors appear to be important in reaching the conclusion that economic
revitalization in New London constitutes such use: a rigorous planning
process, the Court's precedents embodied in Berman and Midkiff, and
deference to federalism and state decision making.
The Court commences its analysis by reiterating that private-private
transfers alone are unconstitutional and any pretextual public purposes meant
solely to accomplish such transfers would fail the public use test.37 The Court,
however, observed that the governmental taking at issue in this case was
meant to "revitalize the local economy by creating temporary and permanent
jobs, generating a significant increase in tax revenue, encouraging spin-off
economic activities and maximizing public access to the waterfront"3 all in
accordance with a "carefully considered"39 and "carefully formulated"'
development plan in accordance with a state statute "that specifically
authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote economic development."4 1
Therefore, the "record clearly demonstrates that the development plan was not
intended to serve the interests of Pfizer, Inc., or any other private entity. "42
Indeed, the Court was particularly impressed by "the comprehensive character
of the plan [and] the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption[.]
43
Although little in the plan demonstrated any actual use by the public, the
Court observed that it had embraced a broader and more "natural"
interpretation of public use as public purpose at least since the end of the
Nineteenth Century,"4 and "[w]e have repeatedly and consistently rejected that
narrow [use by the public] test ever since. 45
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 2661 n.6 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500,
595 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (quotation marks
omitted).
39 Id. at __,125 S. Ct. at 2661 (quotation marks omitted).
40 Id. at __,125 S. Ct. at 2665.
41 Id.
42 Id. at __,125 S. Ct. at 2661 n.6 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500,
595 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (quotation marks
omitted).
43 Id. at __,125 S. Ct. at 2665.
Id. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 2662 (citing Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112
(1896)).
45 Id. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 2663.
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Next, the Court observed that this broad definition of public use accorded
with its "longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this
field."'  The Court then discussed its decisions in Berman and Midkiff as
demonstrations of such legislative deference, quoting heavily from the
language in Berman about "'the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean,
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." 47 The Court concluded that its
"jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in
favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs
justify the use of the takings power."'48 It thus appears that the Court has
clearly and unequivocally substituted a welfare-based public needs test for use
by the public when such needs are legislatively determined.
The Court steadfastly and bluntly rejected any suggestion that it formulate
a more rigorous test.4 9 Thus, for example, to require the government to show
that public benefits would actually accrue with reasonable certainty or that the
implementation of a development plan would actually occur, would take the
Court into factual inquiries already rejected earlier in the term when the Court
rejected the "substantially advances a legitimate state interest" test for
regulatory takings in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.5' Similarly, the Court
declined to second-guess the city's determinations as to what lands it needed
to acquire in order to effectuate the project.5
The Court rejected the invitation by some amici to deal with the
appropriateness of compensation under the circumstances. Although the
Court acknowledged the hardships which the condemnations might entail in
this case, "these questions are not before us in this litigation," even though
members of the Court itself raised the adequacy of compensation during oral
argument.52
4 Id.
"' Id. (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)).
48 Id. at, 125 S. Ct. at 2664.
49 Id. at 125 S. Ct. at 2667.
50 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
51 Kelo, - U.S. -, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
52 Id. at - , 125 S. Ct. at 2668 n.21. Other countries provide a measure of extra
compensation where, as here, it is a private residence which is condemned and the landowner
has a demonstrable emotional attachment to the improved land. See, for example, the Australian
concept of solatium, amounting to up to 10% additional compensation beyond fair market value
in such circumstances, briefly noted (among other compensation issues) in Lee Anne Fennell,
The Death of Poletown: The Future of Eminent Domain and Urban Development After County
of Wayne v. Hathcock: Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 957, 1004
(2004), and referencing Murray J. Raff's more lengthy description in Chapter 1 of TAKING
LAND: COMPULSORY PURCHASE AND REGULATION IN ASIAN-PACIFIC COUNTRIES (Tsuyoshi
Kotaka & David L. Callies eds. 2002).
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Lastly, and most important for purposes of this Article, in a nod to
federalism and states rights, the Court closes by leaving to the states any
remedy for such hardships posed by the condemnations in New London: "We
emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many states already
impose 'public use' requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. 53
Only Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggests some small role yet for federal
courts in determining that a particular exercise of eminent domain might fall
short of the required public use requirement: "There may be private transfers
in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is
so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted
under the Public Use Clause."54 This is, however, largely a due process
argument rather than a Fifth Amendment argument, and in any event,
continued Kennedy: "This demanding level of scrutiny ... is not required
simply because the purpose of the taking is economic development."55
V. THE DISSENTS
Oddly, it is the conservative wing of the Court that argues vigorously for
federal intervention into this area which the liberal wing leaves to the states,
as the vigorous dissents from Justices O'Connor and Thomas demonstrate.
Particularly strong is the dissent by Justice O'Connor who wrote the broadly-
worded Midkiff opinion for a unanimous Court in 1984. Observing that the
question of what is a public use is a judicial, not a legislative one,56 Justice
O'Connor commences by declaring that if economic development takings
meet the public use requirement, there is no longer any distinction between
private and public use of property, the effect of which is "to delete the words
'for public use' from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment."57
But what then of Berman and her own language in Midkiff? These
decisions, according to O'Connor, were exceptions to the Court's
jurisprudence that required public use to be actual use by the public. The
Court, says O'Connor, has "identified" three categories of public use takings
of private property: (1) transfers to public ownership for such as roads,
hospitals and military bases; (2) transfers to private common carriers or
utilities for railroads or stadia (both of which she characterizes as
53 Kelo, - U.S. -, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 (footnoting the recent Michigan decision in
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004)).
54 Id. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
55 Id.
56 Id. at__, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Cincinnati v. Vester, 281
U.S. 439 (1930)).
57 Id. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 2671.
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"straightforward and uncontroversial"); and (3) the rare "public purpose" case
"in certain circumstances and to meet certain exigencies" such as the
eradication of blight and slums in Berman and the elimination of oligopoly in
Midkiff, where deference to legislative determinations were warranted
because the "extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property
inflicted affirmative harm on society . . . ."s In other words, these were
exceptional circumstances clearly not replicated in New London, and the
application of this third exceptional category in these circumstances
"significantly expands the meaning of public use." 59 If, as the majority
suggests, government can take private property and give it to new private users
so long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary public benefit
like increased tax revenues or more jobs, then "for public use" does not
exclude any takings.' Dismissing Justice Kennedy's test as one in which no
one but a "stupid staffer" could fail, Justice O'Connor warns that "[n]othing
is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any
home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.",6' Leaving any
tougher standards designed to limit such possibilities to the states is "an
abdication of our responsibility. States play many important functions in our
system of dual sovereignty, but compensating for our refusal to enforce
properly the Federal Constitution... is not among them. '62 She ends with
concerns for those with fewer resources who will suffer in contests over
exercises of eminent domain with those with "disproportionate influence and
power in the political process, including large corporations and development
firms. 6 3
Justice Thomas raises similar concerns in his dissent, but in considerably
more detail. Picking up on Justice O'Connor's concern for the politically least
powerful and characterizing the Court's deferential standard as "deeply
perverse, ' ' Justice Thomas provides several examples indicating that those
uprooted in even the urban renewal cases were overwhelmingly poor, elderly,
black, or all of the above.65 His disagreement with the Court goes much
deeper than that of Justice O'Connor, however. Reviewing a series of court
opinions and writings from the late Eighteenth Century, Justice Thomas
58 Id. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 2674.
59 Id. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 2675.
60 Id. Justice O'Connor also confesses error (her own as well as the Court's) in ever
equating public use and the police power, from which, she accurately observes, much of the
expanded doctrine of public use into broad public purpose, and particularly deference to
legislative determinations of public purpose, derive. Id.
61 Id. at __,125 S. Ct. at 2676.
62 Id. at __,125 S. Ct. at 2677.
63 Id.
64 Id. at , 125 S. Ct. at 2687 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65 ,a
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concludes that the cases cited by the majority for the proposition that public
use meant public purpose rather than use by the public in the early years of the
republic were exceptions-aberrations that varied from the usual rule.
Thomas concludes that the Court's current public use jurisprudence therefore
rejects the original meaning of the public use clause, to which he urges the
Court to return, and from which it has clearly deviated. 66
V. THE EXTENT OF THE SHIFT: A SELECTIVE STROLL THROUGH THE
SUPREME COURT'S FEDERALISM CASES
A. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
67
The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority ("SAMTA"), a public
mass-transit authority that is the major provider of transportation in the San
Antonio, Texas, metropolitan area,68 sought a declaratory judgment from the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas that, contrary
to the determination of the Wage and Hour Administration of the Department
of Labor, its operations were constitutionally immune from the application of
the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA") under National League of Cities v. Usery.69 The district court
entered judgment for SAMTA, holding that municipal ownership and
operation of a mass-transit system is a traditional governmental function and
thus, under National League of Cities, is exempt from the obligations imposed
by the FLSA.7 °
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that there is nothing in the
overtime and minimum-wage requirements of the FLSA, as applied to
SAMTA that is "destructive of state sovereignty or violative of any
constitutional provision":
7
'
Insofar as the present cases are concerned, then, we need go no further than to
state that we perceive nothing in the overtime and minimum-wage requirements
of the FLSA, as applied to SAMTA, that is destructive of state sovereignty or
violative of any constitutional provision. SAMTA faces nothing more than the
same minimum-wage and overtime obligations that hundreds of thousands of
other employers, public as well as private, have to meet.
66 Id.
67 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
66Id. at 531.
69 Id. at 534. In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Court, by a sharply divided vote,
ruled that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enforce such requirements
against the states "in areas of traditional governmental functions." 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
70 469 U.S. at 535-36.
71 Id. at 554.
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In these cases, the status of public mass transit simply underscores the extent to
which the structural protections of the Constitution insulate the States from
federally imposed burdens .... In short, Congress has not simply placed a
financial burden on the shoulders of States and localities that operate mass-transit
systems, but has provided substantial countervailing financial assistance as well,
assistance that may leave individual mass-transit systems better off than they
would have been had Congress never intervened at all in the area. Congress'
treatment of public mass transit reinforces our conviction that the national
political process systematically protects States from the risk of having their
functions in that area handicapped by Commerce Clause regulation.72
The dissent by O'Connor, in which Rehnquist and Powell joined, expressed
the view that "[t]he true 'essence' of federalism is that the States as States
have legitimate interests which the National Government is bound to respect
even though its laws are supreme."73 Moreover, "[i]f federalism so conceived
and so carefully cultivated by the Framers of our Constitution is to remain
meaningful, this Court cannot abdicate its constitutional responsibility to
oversee the Federal Government's compliance with its duty to respect the
legitimate interests of the States."74 In sum, the Court held the only remedy
the states have under the Tenth Amendment is political, and that there is no
substantive legal effect to the Tenth Amendment.
B. Gregory v. Ashcroft75
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), as
amended in 1974, includes the States as employers,76 and further provides
that:
The term 'employee' means an individual employed by any employer except that
the term 'employee' shall not include any person elected to public office in any
State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any
person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an
appointee on the policymaking level or an immediate adviser with respect to the
exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.'
Several Missouri state judges, two of which were lower-court judges who
had been appointed by the governor and who had been retained in office by
means of retention elections in which the judges had run unopposed, subject
72 Id. at 554-55.
73 Id. at 581.
74 Id.
75 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
76 Id. at 464.
77 Id. at 465 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (2000)).
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to only a "yes or no" vote, filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri challenging the validity of the mandatory
retirement provision in the state's constitution.7" The judges claimed that
article V, section 26, of the Missouri Constitution, which provides that "all
judges other than municipal judges shall retire at the age of seventy years,"
violated the ADEA and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.7 9 The district court, however,
granted the governor's motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Missouri's
appointed judges were not protected by the ADEA because they were
appointees on the policymaking level and therefore excluded from the Act's
definition of "employee"; and (2) the mandatory retirement provision did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause because the provision had a rational
basis.8° On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed on similar grounds.8
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed. 2 In an opinion by O'Connor,
joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, and joined in part as to
holding (2) below by White and Stevens, the Court held that the Missouri
Constitution's mandatory retirement provision did not violate either: (1) the
ADEA because the ADEA does not cover appointed state judges, since, in the
context of a statute that plainly excludes most important state officials, the
ADEA's exclusion of appointees "on the policymaking level" is sufficiently
broad that it cannot be concluded that the Act plainly covers appointed state
judges;83 or (2) the Equal Protection Clause because Missouri had a rational
basis for distinguishing both between judges who had reached age seventy and
judges who were younger, and between judges age seventy and over and other
state employees of the same age who were not subject to mandatory
retirement.84
Justice O'Connor's opinion classically states the case for federalism:
As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual
sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government. This Court also
recognized this fundamental principle .... The Constitution created a Federal
Government of limited powers.... This federalist structure of joint sovereigns
preserves to the people numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized
government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous
society; it increases the opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
78 Id. at 455-56.
71 Id. at 456.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 473.
3 Id. at 467.
8 id. at 470-73.
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processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and
it makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a
mobile citizenry."
White, joined by Stevens, concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment, expressed the view that the court's "plain
statement" requirement for the application of a federal statute to state
activities "ignores several areas of well-established precedent and announces
a rule that is likely to prove unwise and infeasible."86
C. New York v. U.S.87
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985
reflects a compromise whereby "sited" states, which are states that have low-
level radioactive waste disposal sites, agreed to extend by seven years the
period in which they would accept waste from "unsited" states, while the
"unsited" states agreed to end their reliance on the sited states by 1992.88 The
Act required each state to be responsible for providing for the disposal of
wastes generated within its borders. Three types of incentives were provided
to encourage state compliance: (1) under the "monetary incentives"
provisions, sited states were authorized to collect a surcharge for accepting
waste during the seven year extension; a portion of those surcharges would go
into an escrow account held by the United States Secretary of Energy and
would be paid out to states which met a series of deadlines in complying with
their obligations under the Act; 89 (2) under the "access incentives" provisions,
states failing to comply with the statutory deadlines could be charged multiple
surcharges by sited states for a certain period and then denied access
altogether;90 and (3) under the "take title" provision, each state that failed to
provide for the disposal of internally generated waste by a specific date must,
upon request of the waste's generator or owner, take title to the waste, be
obligated to take possession of the waste, and become liable for all damages
incurred by the generator or owner as a consequence of the state's failure to
take possession promptly.9' The State of New York and two of its counties
sought a declaratory judgment that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment and
the Constitution's Guarantee Clause, guaranteeing to the states a republican
85 Id. at 457-58.
86 Id. at 474 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment).
87 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
88 Id. at 151-52.
89 Id. at 152-53.
90 Id. at 153.
9' Id. at 153-54.
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form of government, and filed suit against the United States in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York. 92 The district
court dismissed the complaint, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed.93
In an opinion by O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
and Thomas, the Court held that the "take title" provision was unconstitu-
tional, either as lying outside Congress' enumerated powers or as violating the
Tenth Amendment, "[b]ecause an instruction to state governments to take title
to waste, standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress, and
because a direct order to regulate, standing alone, would also be [invalid], it
follows that Congress lacks the power to offer the States a choice between the
two.
9 4
White, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, dissented in part expressing the
view that: (1) the Act represented a hard-fought agreement among the states
as refereed by Congress, rather than federal direction of state action;95 (2) New
York should be estopped from asserting the unconstitutionality of the "take
title" provision, which sought to insure that the state, after deriving substantial
advantages from the Act, either live up to its bargain by establishing an in-
state waste facility or assume liability for its failure to act;96 (3) such an
incursion on state sovereignty can be deemed ratified by the consent of state
officials;97 and (4) there was no precedential support for the general
proposition that Congress cannot directly compel states to enact and enforce
federal regulatory programs.9" Stevens, writing separately, expressed the view
that the Constitution does not prohibit Congress from simply commanding
state governments to implement congressional legislation. 9
D. U.S. v. Lopez"°
In a famous restriction of federal power under the Commerce Clause, the
Court's conservative wing cobbled together a majority to strike down a federal
statute prohibiting the carrying of firearms within one thousand feet of a
school, on the ground that the relationship to the Commerce Clause was too
attenuated. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy concurred on classic federalism
92 Id. at 154.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 176.
95 Id. at 194 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96 Id. at 198-99.
97 Id. at 200.
98 Id. at 201-207.
9 Id. at 211. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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grounds. In that case, respondent, who was then a 12th-grade student, was
charged in a federal grand jury indictment with the knowing possession of a
firearm at a school zone, in violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990 ("GFSZA").'0 ' The Act makes it a federal offense "for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 1 2 The term "school zone" is
defined as "in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial, or private school or
within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of" such a school.' °3 The
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied the
respondent's motion to dismiss the indictment, concluding that the GFSZA
was a constitutional exercise of Congress' power to regulate activities in and
affecting commerce, and that the business of elementary, middle, and high
schools affects interstate commerce." 4 The respondent was then tried in the
District Court and convicted of violating the Act.0" The respondent appealed,
claiming that the GFSZA exceeded the power of Congress to legislate under
the Commerce Clause."° The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit agreed and reversed, holding that in light of what the court
characterized as insufficient congressional findings and legislative history, the
Act, "in the full reach of its terms, is invalid as beyond the power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause."107
The Supreme Court affirmed. 10 8 In an opinion by Rehnquist, joined by
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, the Court held that the GFSZA
exceeded the authority of Congress to regulate commerce among the several
states under the commerce clause and that the Act could not be sustained as
a regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.'°9
The Court reasoned that the Act "is a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms."... °  The Act also "contains no
jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that
the firearm possession in question affect[ed] interstate commerce.""' While
the Court agreed that "Congress normally is not required to make formal
findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate
101 Id. at 551.
102 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V)) (quotation marks omitted).
''3 Id. at 551 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25)) (quotation marks omitted).
104 Id. at551-52.
105 Id. at 552.
106 id.
107 id.
108 Id. at 568.
109 Id.
"1 Id. at 561.
111 Id.
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commerce," to the extent that findings would have enabled the Court to
evaluate the legislative judgment that the possession of a firearm in a local
school zone substantially affected interstate commerce, such findings were
lacking here." 2 The Court refused to "pile inference upon inference in a
manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States."" 3
Kennedy, joined by O'Connor, concurring, expressed the view that the
GFSZA "upsets the federal balance to a degree that renders it an
unconstitutional assertion of the commerce power... .""' Kennedy agreed
with the majority that "neither the actors nor their conduct have a commercial
character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the Act have an evident
commercial nexus."" 5 "[E]ducation is a traditional concern of the states""' 6
and "[i]f a state or municipality determines that harsh criminal sanctions are
necessary and wise to deter students from carrying guns on school premises,
the reserved powers of the States are sufficient to enact those measures."" 7
The GFSZA "forecloses the States from experimenting and exercising their
own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of history and
expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity beyond the realm of
commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of that term."' 18
Breyer, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissented reasoning that
Congress could have had a rational basis for finding a significant or
substantial connection between gun-related school violence and interstate
commerce. "9 The Court's holding creates "serious legal problems" in that the
holding "runs contrary to modem Supreme Court cases that have upheld
congressional actions despite connections to interstate or foreign commerce
that are less significant than the effect of school violence."' 20
In sum, the liberal wing of the Court has previously eschewed federalism
and states' rights in favor of an increasing federal presence-some would say
intrusion-into the lives of the citizens of the several states that constitute the
United States. Its new-found deference to the states is a welcome shift. But
why now?
112 Id. at 562-63.
"3 Id. at 567.
"4 Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 581.
11 Id. at 583.
"9 Id. at 618-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 625.
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There was very little left of the public use clause-at least in federal
court-even before the Kelo decision. While a growing handful of state
decisions (and federal decisions applying state law on property) found
economic revitalization public purposes invalid on constitutional grounds,12" '
an equal number of decisions agreed with the Connecticut Supreme Court that
this was a valid public use. Clearly this is the view of hundreds of state and
local revitalization and redevelopment agencies.'22 Whether one reads the
Court's previous jurisprudence on public use broadly, as Justice Stevens does
for the Court's majority, or more narrowly, as does the dissent, it is difficult
to argue with the conclusions reached separately by Justices O'Connor and
Thomas: the public use clause is virtually eliminated in federal court. What
yellow light of caution the handful of recent cases signaled has now turned
back to green, and government may once more acquire private property by
eminent domain on the slightest of public purpose pretexts unless such a use
is inconceivable or involves an impossibility, the tests following Midkiff in
1984. In other words, it's now all about process, and process only. There is
no doubt that state and local governments will do much good in terms of
public welfare and public benefits flowing from economic revitalization under
such a relaxed standard, as they have often done in the past. They will do so
with increased attention to carefully-drafted plans and procedures
guaranteeing maximum public exposure and participation, both emphasized
in the majority opinion. Moreover, members of the Court during oral
argument suggested rethinking how to calculate and award "just"
compensation in extenuating circumstances such as those in New London now
that the public use clause is a mere procedural hurdle. And yet, the public use
clause is more than simple policy; it is a bedrock principle contained in the
Bill of Rights amendments to our Federal Constitution, designed not to further
the goals and desires of the majority, but as a shield against majoritarian
excesses at the expense of an otherwise defenseless minority-such as the
Kelos. Surely we could have found grounds to preserve that shield in federal
court. 123
12 See, for example, the decisions in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich.
2004), and Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, 768
N.E.2d 1 (11. 2001).
122 See BERLINER, supra note 23.
'23 See, e.g., James W. Ely Jr., "Poor Relation" Once More: The Supreme Court and the
Vanishing Rights of Property Owners, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW, 2004-05, 39 (Mark
Moiler ed., 2005) (discussing commentary on both sides of the national debate on the decision);
Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or "Hortatory Fluff'?, 33
PEPP. L. REv. 335 (2006); Michael Berger, Court Goes "Clueless": Now Public Use Means
Whatever!, L.A. DAILY J., June 30, 2005, available at
http://www.manatt.com/newsevents.aspx?id=3571&folder=20; John Nolon & Jessica Bacher,
Fallout from Kelo: Ruling Spurs Legislative Proposals to Limit Takings, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 19,
University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 28:32 7
VI. STATE ACTION FOLLOWING KELO: FEDERALISM EXERCISED
WITH A VENGEANCE
States have stepped up to the plate following the public outcry which
greeted the decision. Forty-three state legislatures have passed or will soon
consider eminent domain reform in their legislative sessions.' 24 Local
governments are also taking measures to protect their homeowners, with more
than fifty cities and counties introducing their own bills and resolutions to
restrict the use of eminent domain. 125 Since the ruling, lawmakers in forty-five
states have introduced more than 400 bills on eminent domain. 126
Alabama became the first state to enact new protections against local
government seizure of property allowed under Kelo on August 3, 2005.127
Republican governor Bob Riley signed a bill, which was passed unanimously
by a special session of the Alabama Legislature, that will prohibit govern-
ments from using their eminent domain authority to take privately owned
properties for the purpose of turning them over to retail, industrial, office or
residential developers. 2  Besides Alabama, four other states-Texas,
Delaware, Michigan, and Ohio-have passed legislation to restrict eminent
domain. 29 Michigan approved a constitutional amendment that will be on the
ballot in November and Ohio approved a one-year moratorium on eminent
domain for economic development.130
The Texas bill, known as Senate Bill 7, forbids the taking of private
property if the taking confers a private benefit on a particular private party.
In particular, the bill prohibits the taking of private property for economic
development as a primary purpose and appears to restrict such takings to
blighted areas. The bill applies to all state and local government agencies as
well as institutions of higher learning, particularly if taking land for parking
2005, at 5. See, for a full treatment of the issues raised by the Kelo decision, DWIGHT H.
MERRIAM, EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT (Dwight H. Merriam et al.
eds., 2006).
124 John Kramer & Kisa Knepper, One Year After Kelo Argument National Property Rights
Revolt Still Going Strong (Feb. 2 1, 2006),
http://www.ij.org/private-property/connecticut/2 21 06pr.html.
125 Castle Coalition, Current Proposed Local Legislation on Eminent Domain,
http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/local/index.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
126 Castle Coalition, State Legislative Actions,
http://maps.castlecoalition.org/legislation.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
127 Donald Labro, Alabama Limits Eminent Domain, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at Al.
128 Id.
29 Dennis Cauchon, States Review Eminent Domain, USATODAY, Feb. 20,2006, available
athttp://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-02-19-eminentdomainx.htm?POE=NEWISVA.
130 Id.
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or facility parking. It specifically exempts "traditional" forms of eminent
domain such as transportation projects, railroads, airports, roads, ports,
navigation districts, certain conservation/reclamation districts, water supply,
wastewater, flood control, drainage, libraries, museums, hospitals, parks,
conceivably auditoriums, stadiums and convention facilities and leasehold
interests in government-owned property.1 3'
Commercial companies have also gotten caught up in the public outcry over
Kelo, and on January 25, 2006, BB&T Corporation said it will not lend to
commercial developers that plan to build condominiums, shopping malls and
other private projects on land taken from private citizens by government
entities using eminent domain. BB&T operates more than 1400 financial
centers in eleven states and Washington D.C.-the Carolinas, Virginia,
Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida, Alabama,
and Indiana. 32 BB&T is the nation's ninth largest financial holding company,
with $109.2 billion in assets.'33 In that same week, Montgomery Bank, which
has $800 million in assets, announced that "it will not lend money for projects
in which local governments use eminent domain to take private property for
use by private developers." 134 The century-old financial lending house with six
branches in St. Louis and five branches in Southeast Missouri is the first
Missouri bank to take a principled stand against eminent domain for private
development.135
VII. PLANNING AND THE CONSTITUTION: WHAT PLANNERS SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT THE FIFrH AMENDMENT
Finally, it is all well and good for the majority to wax elegiac about the
importance of planning in land use control. However, as Justice Brennan-a
card-carrying liberal member of the Court if there ever was one-nicely
observed in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego,136 "[I]f a policeman
must know the Constitution, then why not a planner?" ' 7 There, recall, San
131 Peter G. Smith, Prospective Impacts of Texas Legislation Prohibiting Condemnation for
Economic Development, Presentation at the Annual Program on Planning, Zoning and Eminent
Domain at the Center for American and International Law (Nov. 2, 2005).
132 BB&T, BB&T Announces Eminent Domain Policy, Jan. 25, 2006,
http://www.bbandt.com/about/media/newsreleasedetail.asp?date=1%2F25%2F06+9%3A48
%3A52+AM.
133 Id.
134 John Kramer & Lisa Knepper, Montgomery Bank Won't Finance Eminent Domain
Abuse: Second bank ,within week to reject eminent domain for private gain, Feb. 6, 2006,
http://www.castlecoalition.org/media/releases/2-6-06pr.htmi.
135 id.
136 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
137 Id. at 661 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Diego had reclassified (from industrial to agricultural through zoning, and to
open space through an open space plan) dozens of acres owned by the utility
and acquired for the construction of a power plant. 3 s The utility successfully
sued for damages, only to have its damage claim eventually overruled by the
California Supreme Court which held invalidation was its only remedy. The
Supreme Court narrowly voted to dismiss the utility's appeal for lack of a
final judgment. 139
Justice Brennan wrote a stinging dissent from which the above quotation is
taken, noting that invalidation fell substantially short of a sufficient remedy,
and proposing that once a court finds there has been a regulatory taking, the
government must pay just compensation, either for the entire value of the
property or, should government revoke the offending regulation, for the period
during which the regulation effected a taking."4
Justice Stevens, however, was apparently unimpressed. In his dissent in
First English v. Los Angeles,14 1 Stevens stated that he liked Justice Brennan's
take on takings much better, and finally persuaded the Court to his way of
thinking in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency.
142
The Supreme Court's narrow holding in Tahoe-Sierra broke little new
ground in the takings debate, holding merely that a thirty-two-month
moratorium is not a per se taking of property. 43 It is flawed in several
respects, both in its random choice in factual context and in its
misinterpretation of the Court's previous decisions in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Commission" and First English, all as set out in the cogent dissent
by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, who joined in the first opinion and wrote
Id. at 624-25 (majority opinion).
9 Id. at 636 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
14 Indeed, this theory became a matter of constitutional law in 1987, in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), an opinion
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist who provided the fifth vote in favor of dismissal in San
Diego Gas & Electric, by means of a concurring opinion in which he stated that except for the
procedural issue, he basically agreed with the Brennan dissent on substance. 450 U.S. at 633-36
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
14' 482 U.S. at 335, 349 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
143 See, for comment on the marginal relevance of the decision, David L. Callies & Calvert
G. Chipchase, Moratoria and Musings on Regulatory Takings: Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 279 (2003). See, for a
different view on the importance of the holding, J. David Breemer, Temporary Insanity: The
Long Tale of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council and Its Quiet Ending in the United States
Supreme Court, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2002).
1- 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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the second, and therefore can authoritatively comment upon what the Court
said and meant.
In particular, the majority demonstrated a misunderstanding of land-use
planning and controls by suggesting that loss of the moratorium as a planning
tool would eviscerate local land-use regulatory schemes. As my colleague
Edward Ziegler so amply demonstrates in his treatise, moratoria are only one
form of interim land-use control, whose purpose is to maintain the status quo,
not by stopping all economically beneficial land use, but by freezing existing
land uses or by allowing the issuance of only selective building permits.'45
The lengthy moratorium imposed by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
goes far beyond either one. Moreover, lengthy interim controls are usually
provided by the enactment of interim zoning measures. Moratoria are
designed for exceedingly short periods while interim zoning is formulated and
adopted. The history of zoning is replete with such traditions, including short-
term delays as part of a state's background principles of its law of property
(though this is something of a stretch) and so beyond the reach of the Lucas
categorical rule in the same manner as regulations that are designed to abate
nuisances are, on the ground that such matters were not part of an owner's title
to begin with. But a six-year (or indeed a three-year) moratorium does not fit
within such an exception, at least in part because such lengthy moratoria are
anathema to traditional land-use management and control processes of the sort
envisioned in First English. As Rehnquist noted in conclusion, keeping Lake
Tahoe as pristine as possible is clearly in the public interest. 6 However, the
way in which the Tahoe Regional Planning Commission has gone about it
targets only certain citizens, whereas the Constitution "requires that the costs
and burdens be borne by the public at large."' 47 The majority was clearly
overly persuaded by arguments favoring land-use planning.
Thus, the liberal wing of the Court seems overly enamored of plans and
planning as an excuse to avoid applying the public use standards of the Fifth
Amendment. Planners, policemen-indeed all connected with government-
need to know and apply the Constitution, and particularly the Fifth Amend-
ment.
45 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, RATHKOPF'S LAW OF ZONING & PLANNING (4th ed. 2005).
4 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 354 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
147 id.

